

## FRENCH INDO-CHINA

which has reasonable historical explanations, but which cripples the whole movement. Mismanagement of funds has from the outset discredited nationalist parties. This, as well as prudent selfishness, may explain why the Annamites, who claim they would sacrifice everything for patriotic ideals, do not contribute voluntarily to the movement.

The Annamite bourgeoisie is rich and selfish. Often it is wounded vanity that has pushed the Annamite into the nationalist party, and no great movement can be built upon such shifting emotional sand. Violence and dishonesty, which extends to the deliberate falsification of reports, have gone far towards alienating liberal sympathizers in France.

Not all the nationalist parties are revolutionary. The Tonkinese Party of Pham Quynh and the Constitutional Party of Bui Quang Chieu want reforms along democratic lines rather than a violent break with France. In 1925 a secret society called the Revolutionary Party of Young Annam (Tan-Viet-Cach-Manh-Bang) was founded in North Annam among the small bourgeoisie of nationalist sentiments. It never grew beyond the organizing stage before most of its members were absorbed into the communist party. The roots of this party went way back to a group called Phuc Viet, the Restoration of Annam, formed in the Poulo Condore penitentiary among the prisoners from the Chinese manner, linked to the exiled Pham Boi Chau, but it went quiescently underground when the Chieu conspiracy was betrayed to the government. In the post-War period it was revived through an alliance between the Siamese and Chinese revolutionaries, but it was more moderate and

methodically organized than of yore. In fact it was too mild to please the revolutionary element, who leaned more and more to Cantonese communism.

The party, which took the name of Vietnam-Cach-Manh-Bang in 1926, thus contained two increasingly divergent elements—the nationalists and communists. The failure of Pham Quynh at about this time to win governmental approval of his moderate reform programme sent many of the neutral members into the revolutionary camp, and made the Cantonese influence predominate. The period which followed was one of preparation and organization: it was the era of strikes and manifestations. The leaders\* mutual jealousy, as well as their failure to fuse the two opposing camps, proved fatal. When trouble broke out in Canton, in 1929, the Aunamites felt generally that the Cantonese Communists had deceived and exploited them. The leaders became